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In his article on IACUCS,l L. Finsen provides three 
useful categories of ethical pmlpectives one can take 
on research using nonhuman animals. One can hold to 
a laissez{aire approach, a 'moderate' approach, or an 
abolitionist approach. The first considers that aU 
research on nonhuman animals is justifiable provided 
it adheres to 'humane' standards of minimizing pain 
and distress; the third considers that no research 
on nonhuman animals is justifiable whether it is 
'humanely' conducted or not; and the second, 
'moderate', approach, holds that some research is 
justifIable, some not, depending on the purpose of the 
research, and that all justifiable research must adhere 
to 'humane' standards. 
In this paper I want to 1) relate how a 'moderate' 
was appointed to the Institutional Animal Care and Use 
Committee (IACUC) at the Oregon Regional Primate 
Research Center (ORPRC) and some of the results of 
this; 2) raise questions as to the proper place for the 
sortofethical concern for animals thatFinsen supports; 
3) indicate why I'm a 'moderate'. 
1. I was appointed as the lay, outside, member of 
the IACUC at ORPRC by the Director ofORPRC after 
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an interview with him and the director of public 
relations. In this interview, the Director asked me 
whether I had 'an open mind' about research using 
animals. I said I did, and shortly was asked to become 
a member of the committee. I was not asked whether I 
was for this, that, or the other type of research nor 
whether I was against this, that, or the other. And the 
Director seemed wen aware that I might vote against 
various research proposals and that I might ask various 
awkward or unwelcome questions. He did not appear 
to want a layperson who would simply rubber stamp 
whatever proposal met the approval of the other 
members of the committee, and there was some 
indication that he was even desirous of having a person 
on the committee who would raise important questions 
that would not otherwise be raised. I believe that, by 
the letter of the law, he did not have to have these 
concerns, and that he could have attempted to appoint 
a rubber stamp, but I think there are powerful political 
reasons, constituted primarily by the animal rights 
movement, favoring the course of action this Director 
took, and that these reasons apply to many other 
directors of such institutions as the ORPRC across 
the US. 
After being appointed, I was given the NIH guide 
for the care and use of laboratory animals. This is the 
Bible for IACUCs. It would not be unfair to say that 
this guide is most consonant with a laissez{aire 
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approach to research using animals but that it is not 
inconsistent with a 'moderate' approach. Specifically, 
it does not disallow the question, Does the purpose of 
this research and the likely benefits either to humans or 
to animals warrant using animals in the way proposed? 
That it does not entail or mandate this question seems 
to me to be a defect in it, but that, except on very strict 
and determined constructions of it, it doesn't disallow 
the asking of this question means that it makes room 
for 'moderates' on IACUCs. 
The IACUC on which I serve requires that each 
researcher submit to the committee a 'Notice ofIntent' 
(NOI). Shortly after I joined the committee this NOI 
was revised. The chair solicited help from members, 
and I requested that there be a section in which the 
researcher is required to answer the following directive: 
'State, in lay terms, how your proposed research is likely 
to benefit human or animal health or well-being'. This 
request was adopted. This means that each researcher 
has to say something in this section, and that something 
is, for me (and I think for any 'moderate'), of 
fundamental importance for evaluating the justifiability 
of the proposed project 
I now give an example of a controversy generated 
by thinking about this question, which is also an 
example of the impact a 'moderate' can have on an 
IACUC. At ORPRC, a good deal of research pertains 
to the problem of human infertility (HIR:::Human 
Infertility Research). Some of this research involves 
the use of monkeys and baboons. This 'use' involves 
killing some of them, separating infants from their 
mothers at birth, as well as subjecting them to various 
operations and manipulations (not to mention the 
original acts ofcapturing them or their progenitors and 
caging them in individual cages). The justification for 
all this is 'the problem ofhuman infertility.' In essence, 
this problem is that some couples who want to have 
children in the nonnal biological way (the figure may 
be as high as 20% of all such couples who want to have 
children in the normal way) cannot do so without 
medical help. So, in short, the problem is that some 
couples cannot fulfill their desire to have children. Is 
the possibility ofalleviating this a sufficientjustification 
for 'using' monkeys and baboons in the ways indicated 
above? I asked thisquestion of the committee and began 
arguing that it was not The essence of my argument is 
that nonhuman primates should be subjected to the types 
of uses above indicated only if: 1) seriously life-
threatening diseases or disabilities or seriously life-
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diminishing diseases or disabilities are in question; 2) 
there is good reason to believe that they are likely to be 
ameliorated by using animals; 3) it is not now plausible 
to argue that humans are themselves responsible for 
the diseases and disabilities from which they suffer due 
to activities they could abstain from if they would. 
was able to do this because of the question on the NOI 
pertaining to the likely benefits to humans or animals. 
My questioning generated much heat and activity and 
some rethinking and reevaluation, and still continues 
to do so, though my arguments have not, by any means, 
produced the changes I think desirable and even 
obligatory. (perhaps they shouldn't; perhaps they're 
not convincing. The point is, there was and is a forum 
for their getting stated and the potential for their having 
the desired effect) 
2. As Finsen brings out in his article, the authorized 
function of the IACUCs is to see to it that the NIH 
guidelines are followed. These guidelines, as Finsen 
also brings out,lean toward the laissezlaire perspective 
and do not require "discussion and evaluation of the 
ethical dimensions of proposed and ongoing research 
involving animals," if"ethical dimensions" is here taken 
to encompass questions outside those of pain, suffering, 
the performance of multiple major surgeries on one 
animal, and the method of killing the animal. Now, in 
my view, the NIH guidelines should require a broader 
discussion than they do. But I think it is insufficiently 
recognized that Congress has authorized and provided 
the funds for institutions such as ORPRC to do basic 
research using a variety of nonhuman animals, thereby 
indicating approval of such research. It is not at all 
clear that. given this approval, it is required that it direct 
the NIH to pass regulations which require that 
researchers have their proposals subjected to wide-
ranging ethical scrutiny, especially of the kind the 
abolitionist would insist on. It may be that it is wrong 
to do the kind of research using nonhuman animals that 
scores of research facilities authorized by Congress 
around the nation do. But it is not clear why Congress 
is required to pass regulations which require each 
institution engaging in research that it (or its agents) 
judges to be ethically appropriate to debate the rightness 
or wrongness of such research. And it is far from clear 
that it makes sense to include an abolitionist as part of 
any IACUC. The IACUC is not there to shut down the 
place, if it can, but to enforce regulations which 
Congress (or its representatives) judges to be 
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appropriate within the context of its broad approval of 
such research. The most appropriate place for the 
abolitionist is in the forums for public debate (including 
Congress, should one be able to get elected) about what 
policies there should be. 
3. The discussion to this point has not been terribly 
philosophical. I now want to indicate why I am a 
'moderate', thereby throwing down the gauntlet for 
philosoprucaldebare. 
If I knew that my son would contract multiple 
sclerosis (MS) when he reaches 14, would slowly 
become crippled and unable to live the active life most 
adults take for granted, and that he would die at age 30 
in what would otherwise have been the prime of his 
life, I would favor research that involves using 
nonhuman animals, specifically primates, that would 
certainly spare him this fate. I would favor it knowing 
that it involves, among other things, caging the 
experimental animals, performing surgery on them, 
subjecting them to some factor believed to cause MS, 
and eventually painlessly killing them. I would favor 
it even if it had merely a good chance of sparing him 
this fate. 
Now to this the standard comeback is: "You 
wouldn't favor any of this if it involved human beings. 
So how can you favor it simply because it involves 
monkeys? What is the morally relevant difference?" 
My fIrst response to this is one of incredulity. Is 
one saying that if one could save one's dearly beloved 
young wife or daughter from some tragic disease by 
capturing a monkey and using it in the ways indicated 
in research, one would not do it? I have heard animal 
advocates say that they would do it, but that that 
wouldn't make it right. But then they're simply failing 
to live up to their ethical standards, and the question is 
why they should fail thus. Why not live up to them if 
they actually believe them? My guess is that they don't 
actually believe them. They value their loved ones a 
lot more than they value nonhuman animals. 
My second response to this standard comeback is to 
say that in a state of nature, I would favor doing to 
human beings what I now favor doing only to nonhuman 
animals. I don't favor doing to humans what I propose 
to do to animals not because I think hwnans as a species 
possess some distinctive, inherently valuable properties 
but, in part, because I'm in a state ofsociety with respect 
to humans. In this state I've undertaken to treat them 
in certain ways, and to refrain from treating them in 
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certain ways, provided they undertake to do likewise. 
(Consider some of these ways. I am to refrain from 
eating human flesh, not merely from revulsion or 
irrational taboo, but out of respect for human beings. I 
am to favor appropriate disposition of human remains, 
not out of health or aesthetic considerations, but out of 
respect. I am to prefer to kill any kind of animal rather 
than kill any human being, again out of respect and 
human solidarity implicit in the social contract. I am 
to think of human needs []fst rather than animal needs. 
Anyone failing to live up to these and other ways of 
dealing with their fellow human beings are rightly 
regarded as outside society to a degree, because 
insufficiently mindful of their fellow citizens and 
social mates.) 
My third response is that I value lots ofhumans more 
than I value any animal. This is, obviously, not to say I 
don't value animals. It's not to say that I don't value 
them a great deal and think that a great deal that is done 
to them is of little value and is wrong. But why am I 
wrong to value lots of humans a good dt',al more than I 
value any animal? I could tell you why I do-I can 
talk to them, engage in various enjoyable activities with 
them, share their joys and sorrows, etc. You will then 
ask me why these are valuable, more valuable than what 
I can do with animals or what animals can do with each 
other. But then I can ask you why they are not more 
valuable and the question will probably end in stalemate, 
values and evaluation of values being what they are. I 
can then add, what I've already said, that I do value 
lots of humans a lot more than I value any animal. 
The upshot is this. I'm a 'moderate' because I value 
my son's life, and many other human lives, more than I 
value any animal's life; and I live in a state of society 
where it is incumbent on me, and all others, to treat 
each other in certain ways. This state of society is 
something I value, something that seems essential, given 
my values, and something that grows out of my values, 
also. And, as of now, I can't see any good Tt',ason for 
changing it in the way aboiitionists would have us do. 
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